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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The United States District Court for the Territory of New
Union Island exercised federal question jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs’ claims against the United States of America under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) and jurisdiction for the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The District Court
entered its judgement on August 15, 2018, dismissing all of
Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. This
court has jurisdiction over the order of the District Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

May a claim be brought under the ATS against a
domestic corporation, as a general, categorical matter?

II.

Is the Trail Smelter Principle a recognized principle of
customary international law enforceable as a Law of
Nations under the ATS?

III.

Does the Trail Smelter Principle impose obligations
enforceable against non- governmental actors?

IV.

Does the Clean Air Act (CAA) displace ATS claims
alleging violation of the Trail Smelter Principle for
harms caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions?

V.

Should this court create a federal public trust cause of
action and a new Fifth Amendment substantive Due
Process right for the global climate system?

VI.

Do Plaintiffs’ attempts to use the ATS and public trust
doctrine to regulate GHG emissions present nonjusticiable political questions?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal of an order of the District Court for New
Union Island granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs—
an alien national, a U.S. citizen, and a not-for-profit organization—
had sought injunctive and monetary relief for harms caused by
global climate change and sea level rise, allegedly induced by
greenhouse gas emissions attributable to HexonGlobal’s fossil
fuels and the United States government’s failure to more
significantly control such emissions. This case is ultimately about
the scope of a court’s power to extend common law solutions to the
global problem of climate change, and whether such solutions have
already been or should be decided by the political branches. This
appeal is also about whether a court should craft its decision on
grounds broader than necessary to resolve the case. In dealing with
these complex issues, the District Court correctly held that the
Clean Air Act displaces Plaintiffs’ claim brought under the Alien
Tort Statute for HexonGlobal’s alleged violations of the Trail
Smelter Principle. The District Court also correctly declined to
extend an unprecedented Due Process-based public trust claim to
government protection of a stable climate system.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
I.

Parties

Plaintiffs include: Apa Mana (Mana), an alien national of the
island nation A’Na Atu; Noah Flood (Flood), a U.S. Citizen and
resident of New Union Island, a United States territory; and the
Organization of Disappearing Island Nations (ODIN), a not-forprofit membership organization representing the interests of
island nations threatened by sea level rise. Record at 3. Defendants
are the United States federal government and HexonGlobal, a U.S.
corporation created from the merger of all major U.S. oil producers.
R. at 5.
II.

Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries from Climate Change

Climate change is a global phenomenon caused by an
overabundance of GHGs in the atmosphere, which is largely
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attributable to the burning of fossil fuels for energy (electricity,
heat, and transportation), as well as emissions from agricultural
and industrial activity. R. at 4. Some impacts of climate change
include rising temperatures, rising sea levels, more intense storms,
and ocean acidification. R. at 4–5.
Plaintiffs Flood and Mana reside and own homes on islands
whose populated areas are at an elevation projected to be
completely inundated by sea level rise and rendered uninhabitable
by the end of the century if current GHG emissions trends
continue. R. at 4–5. Due to rising sea levels, Flood and Mana have
suffered seawater damage to their homes and drinking water
wells. Id. Further, rising temperatures threaten their health by
increasing risk of heat stroke and mosquito-borne diseases, while
ocean acidification threatens to deplete the fish population, which
is their primary food supply. R. at 5.
III. HexonGlobal’s GHG Contributions
Defendant HexonGlobal is an oil producer that is incorporated
in New Jersey, has its primary place of business is in Texas, and
operates refineries throughout the world, including in New Union
Island. Id. HexonGlobal and its predecessors are responsible for
32% of the United States’ cumulative fossil fuel-related GHG
emissions and 6% of global historical emissions. Id.
IV. The United States’ Management of GHG Emissions
Activities in the United States are responsible for 20% of
cumulative global human- caused GHG emissions. R. at 6. The U.S.
government has sought to address the dual needs for energy
production and environmental protection through a variety of
programs, commitments, and regulations. On one hand, the United
States promotes energy production by providing tax subsidies for
fossil fuel production, leasing lands and waters for energy
production, developing an interstate highway system, and creating
public agency-run power plants. Id. On the other hand, the United
States has acknowledged the threat of climate change and made
commitments and taken steps to regulate GHG emissions from a
comprehensive range of sources. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5

4

2019]

RUNNER UP - BEST BRIEF

121

In 1992, the United States Senate ratified the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Id.;
UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 169. This Convention,
seeking to achieve “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations . . . at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” committed
the nation parties to “adopt national policies and take
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”
Id. at 169–71.
The United States has fulfilled this international commitment
in numerous ways. First, Congress adopted the CAA, which
requires the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to regulate “air pollutants” from a comprehensive range of
sources, including (but not limited to) motor vehicles under Section
202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012); new, modified and existing
stationary sources such as power plants under Section 111, id. at
§7411(b), (d), (f); and commercial aircrafts, id. at §7571(q). The
Supreme Court confirmed that, under the CAA, the EPA can
regulate GHGs as “air pollutants” from motor vehicles under
Section 202(a), R. at 6; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532
(2007), as well as from stationary sources under Section 111. R. at
9; Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 424–26
(2011). In 2009, the EPA issued an “endangerment finding,”
recognizing that GHGs pose a threat to public health, and
triggering the EPA’s CAA duty to regulate GHGs from motor
vehicles. R. at 6; 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). The EPA
subsequently regulated GHG emissions from new motor vehicles
under the CAA, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,323, 25,329–30 (May 7, 2010); 77
Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,638 (Oct. 15, 2012); medium-and heavy-duty
trucks, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011); 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478
(Oct. 25, 2016); new power plants pursuant to Section 111(b), 80
Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015); and existing power plants
pursuant to Section 111(d), Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661
(Oct. 23, 2015). The EPA also issued regulations pertaining to
GHG emissions from new and modified sources under the Act’s
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7470–7479, and Title V permitting program, Id. At §§ 7661–
7661f, 7602(j). 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010). However, the
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Supreme Court limited application of these PSD and Title V
regulations to sources that would be regulated anyway due to their
non-GHG pollutants. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A.
(UARG), 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2440–41, 2449 (2014); R. at
7.
Showing the complexity and political nature involved in
regulating GHG emissions and addressing global climate change
while balancing the economic, health, and safety needs of the
nation, some of these administrative actions are being rolled back
under President Trump. For example, the EPA repealed the Clean
Power Plan. R. at 8; 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (Aug. 31, 2018), and
announced its intent to repeal other regulations. In addition,
President Trump announced his intent to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement. R. at 7. Congress, however, has not changed the CAA’s
legislative scheme authorizing GHG regulation.
V. Legal Claims Asserted
Plaintiff Mana and ODIN brought suit against HexonGlobal
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which allows United States
District Courts to hear disputes brought by aliens for violations of
a treaty of the United States or a law of nations. 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2012). Mana asserts that HexonGlobal’s GHG emissions, induced
by the sale and production of fossil fuels, violates the principle
announced in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, which holds that
emissions within one country may not cause substantial harm in
another country. R. at 8.
Plaintiffs Flood and ODIN brought suit against the United
States, asserting that the U.S. Constitution provides citizens a
fundamental Due Process right to a healthy and stable climate
system, actionable under a federal public trust doctrine. R. at 10.
Although the public trust doctrine has not traditionally provided
protections to the climate system or the atmosphere, Flood asserts
the global climate system is common property the government has
an obligation to protect. Id. Flood asserts the U.S. government
failed to stop private parties from producing, selling, and
combusting fossil fuels, and that this has infringed upon a
potential fundamental right to a stable environment and violated
the government’s public trust obligations. Id.
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VI. Procedural History
The District Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for
failure to state a valid claim. R. at 10–11. Specifically, the District
Court found that Mana’s claim under the ATS is displaced by the
Clean Air Act. R. at 10. The Court also dismissed Plaintiff Flood’s
claim, finding no legal basis for a Fifth Amendment right to
government protection from atmospheric climate change under the
public trust doctrine. R. at 11. Flood, Mana, and ODIN brought
this appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This court should affirm the District Court’s holding that the
CAA displaces Plaintiffs’ claim brought under the ATS for
HexonGlobal’s alleged violation of the Trail Smelter Principle.
Likewise, this court should follow the District Court in declining to
create an unprecedented Due Process-based public trust claim to a
stable climate system. Alternatively, this court should find such
claims are nonjusticiable political questions. Finally, this court
should refrain from drawing its holding any broader and risk
barring all valid ATS claims against corporate defendants or valid
Trail Smelter Principle claims. We address the issues in the order
presented by this court.
First, the text, purpose, and history of the ATS permit claims
against domestic corporations. The plain language of the ATS—
which allows aliens to bring civil actions for torts committed in
violation of international norms—does not bar any specific type of
defendant, and corporations have long been liable for torts.
Categorically barring domestic corporate defendants would
undermine the original purpose of the ATS, which was to avoid
international friction by ensuring that foreign plaintiffs have a
remedy for international law violations committed on U.S. soil or
waters. Domestic corporate defendants do not inherently increase
the risk of international friction, while barring claims against them
could abet institution-wide harms and might provoke foreign
nations to hold the United States accountable. Every U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals, except for the Second Circuit, agrees domestic
corporations may be held liable under the ATS, and this court
should follow. While Mana’s specific claim should not move
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forward because it either has already been or should be addressed
by the political branches, this court should not issue an
unprecedented, sweeping rule barring all other ATS claims against
corporations.
Second, the Trail Smelter Principle is a recognized norm of
customary international law actionable under the ATS because it
passes Sosa’s two-step inquiry. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 725 (2004). The Trail Smelter Principle is a norm broadly
accepted by civilized nations, as evidenced by its wide use in
international treaties, declarations, conventions, and courts.
Further, scholarly sources extensively refer to it as a customary
international law. The Principle proscribes conduct—
transboundary pollution that directly harms people or property in
another State—with sufficient specificity to make it enforceable
under the ATS, while ensuring the courts’ floodgates will not be
opened to claims of a different nature. Thus, the Trail Smelter
Principle is actionable under the ATS for concrete harms of
transboundary pollutants.
Third, the Trail Smelter Principle imposes obligations on nongovernmental parties. The original arbitration required a private,
Canadian smelter to make extensive operational changes.
Therefore, this court should similarly allow claims brought under
the ATS to impose obligations on non-state parties. However, even
if this court were to decide the Principle is generally only
enforceable against state actors, the court should allow liability
against private parties acting under the color of state law,
consistent with past precedent.
Fourth, although the Trail Smelter Principle may be a valid
cause of action under the ATS in other situations, Mana’s use of
the Principle to address GHG emissions and climate change has
been displaced by Congress with the CAA. Federal common law
claims, such as those under the ATS, are displaced when a federal
statute directly addresses the issue raised in the lawsuit. Mana’s
claims are indistinguishable from holdings of the Supreme Court
and lower courts that the CAA authorizes the regulation of GHGs
from mobile and stationary sources and therefore displaces federal
common law claims seeking to address GHGs. Further, the CAA
affords Mana multiple avenues to enforce emissions standards,
including the Citizen Suit and “International Air Pollution”
provisions, and petitioning for a rulemaking.
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Fifth, Plaintiffs stretch the public trust doctrine—a common
law doctrine preventing the monopolization of navigable
waterways—far beyond what any court or legislature has ever
recognized, by providing protections to the global climate system.
The U.S. Supreme Court clearly established that the public trust
doctrine does not provide a cause of action under federal law, and
Plaintiffs’ claim would require this court to invent a new
fundamental right that dozens of courts emphatically rejected.
Recognizing Plaintiffs’ public trust doctrine claim would require
this court to contravene Supreme Court precedent and impose on
the federal government a retroactive fiduciary duty to act as a
global trustee to the atmosphere and climate system.
Finally, even if Mana’s claim is not fully displaced by the CAA,
and even if Flood could bring a Due Process claim under the public
trust doctrine, these claims present nonjusticiable political
questions the court should leave to the politically accountable
executive and legislative branches. While a federal court is the
appropriate venue for typical ATS claims, Plaintiffs’ claims stretch
the ATS and Trail Smelter Principle beyond their scope to
circumvent the legislative and executive branches’ international
and domestic policy authority. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ claims would
improperly use the public trust doctrine, a matter of state law, as
a vehicle to set international climate change policy impacting every
consumer of fossil fuels. Not only would these claims require this
court to interfere with sensitive international policy decisions,
crafting climate policy would require the court to make initial
policy determinations on appropriate levels of GHGs and manage
the standard for millions of people and corporations.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Circuit courts review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.
Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2017); Davis v. Billington, 681 F.3d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2012). To
survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to
state a claim that is plausible on its face” and that rises “above the
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555,
570 (2007).

9
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ARGUMENT
I. Claims Against Domestic Corporations May Be Brought
Under the ATS
The District Court asked, without answering, if a claim may
be brought against a domestic corporation under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS). R. at 9. While there are other reasons Mana’s claim
should not move forward, see infra §§ IV, VI, HexonGlobal’s
corporate status is not one. As at least four justices on the Supreme
Court agree, “[t]he text, history, and purpose of the ATS, as well as
the long and consistent history of corporate liability in tort, confirm
that tort claims for law-of-nations violations may be brought
against [domestic] corporations under the ATS.” Jesner v. Arab
Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1419 (2018) (Sotomayer, J.,
dissenting).1
The ATS provides, in full, that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). As the District Court
noted, R. at 8, the Supreme Court has placed some limits on ATS
claims with regard to the allegedly violative conduct and who may
be a defendant. First, a claim must allege a violation of an
international “norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.”
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. Second, adjudicating the claim must be an
“appropriate” exercise of judicial discretion in light of the “serious
separation-of-powers and foreign relations concerns” implicated by
the ATS. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403 (Kennedy, J., majority)
(holding, under this second test, that it would be “inappropriate”
to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations, due to foreign
relations concerns) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729).
We apply the first test to Mana’s Trail Smelter claim in
Sections II and III, infra, to examine what “conduct violates the
law of nations” and whether the specific norm at issue requires
that the “conduct must be undertaken by a particular type of
1The Jesner majority only barred ATS claims against foreign corporations;
neither the majority nor plurality decided if the ATS imposes liability on
corporations generally. 138 S. Ct. at 402.
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actor.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
However, this “norm-specific first step is inapposite to the
categorical question [of] whether corporations may be sued under
the ATS as a general matter.” Id. at 1420. Rather, this court’s
threshold question of whether the ATS allows claims against
domestic corporations may be answered in the affirmative under
the second ATS test, because “nothing about the [domestic]
corporate form in itself raises foreign policy concerns” that would
require barring all claims against domestic corporations. Id. at
1428. Although resolution of Mana’s specific claims must be to be
left to the political branches, see §§IV, VI, a sweeping ban on all
claims against domestic corporations contravene the text, purpose,
and history of the ATS.
A. The text of the ATS does not limit the type of
available defendant
“It is axiomatic that ‘[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself.’”
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)
(citation omitted). First, the plain language of the ATS “provides
no express exception for corporations.” Romero v. Drummond Co.,
552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). In fact, the ATS “does not
distinguish among classes of defendants” at all. Argentine Republic
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989). By
contrast, the ATS does expressly limit the class of permissible
plaintiffs (to aliens). “That silence as to defendants cannot be
presumed to be inadvertent.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1426
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). “Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)
(citation omitted). Therefore, it can be inferred that Congress
intentionally limited what plaintiffs may bring an ATS claim and
intentionally chose not to limit range of available defendants.
Second, the ATS allows aliens to bring “a civil action” for a
“tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. When Congress used the term of art “tort,”
“it presumably kn[ew] and adopt[ed] the cluster of ideas that were
attached.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
“Corporations have long been held liable in tort under the federal
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common law.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1425 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(citing Phila., Wilminton, & Balt. R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202
(1859). In sum, while the specific international norm issue in an
ATS claim may only allow claims against certain actors, the
statute itself does not create such limitations.
B. The purpose of the ATS requires that domestic
corporations be held liable
“The ATS was intended to promote harmony in international
relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for internationallaw violations in circumstances where the absence of such a
remedy might provoke foreign nations to hold the United States
accountable.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1406 (Kennedy, J., majority).
Given this purpose and the “foreign-policy and separation-ofpowers concerns inherent in ATS litigation,” the Supreme Court
has cautioned that ATS claims should be allowed only in “narrow
circumstances” and “must be ‘subject to vigilant doorkeeping.’” Id.
at 1398 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729). Closing the door entirely,
however, would undermine Congress’ intent in passing the ATS.
Courts should only bar a claim when allowing it to proceed will
cause or has “caused significant diplomatic tensions.” Id. at 1406.
In Jesner, the Court held that “foreign corporations may not
be defendants in suits brought under the ATS,” in a case where
claims were brought against Arab Bank for allegedly financing
terrorism. Id. at 1407 (emphasis added). Because Arab Bank is a
“major Jordanian financial institution,” and both Jordan and Arab
Bank are counterterrorism allies of the United States, the
prolonged litigation “caused significant diplomatic tensions.” Id. at
1406. Considering this case to be demonstrative of a general axiom
that “foreign corporate defendants create unique problems” in
foreign relations, the Court explained it was necessary to set a
categorical bar against judicially allowing foreign corporations to
be defendants in ATS suits. Id. at 1407.
In contrast to the Jesner Court’s concerns that imposing
liability on foreign corporations provokes foreign policy
consequences, “nothing about the [domestic] corporate form in
itself raises foreign policy concerns” to a level that requires the
court to create a new prohibition on claims against domestic
corporations. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1428 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
Rather, refusing to provide a remedy against a corporate defendant
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could actually raise the possibility of international friction—the
precise situation the ATS was originally designed to avoid. For
example, if a U.S. corporation engaged in piracy in U.S. waters or
trafficked foreign individuals on U.S. soil, allowing only individual
employees to be held liable would shirk “accountability for the
institution-wide [violation of an international norm]. Absent a
corporate sanction, that harm will persist unremedied.” Id. at
1435. Domestic corporate accountability is therefore necessary
under the ATS for the same reasons it is necessary generally—to
cut-off institutionally supported and widespread injustices. There
is no reason to conclude that, in enacting the ATS, Congress
thought it was necessary to provide foreign plaintiffs with a
piecemeal remedy for comparatively small harms caused by
individuals, but not for larger harms caused by corporations.
Creating a categorical bar against all domestic corporate liability
would be using “a sledgehammer to crack a nut.” Id. at 1431.
Instead, courts should ensure ATS claims adhere to the intent of
the First Congress by enforcing the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013), and examining on a claim-by-claim
basis whether the provision of a remedy would create international
friction.
C. Judicial precedent maintains that corporations may
be held liable
Every U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals except for the Second
Circuit has allowed corporations to be held liable under the ATS.2
In addition, the Supreme Court’s failure to categorically bar all
corporate liability in the two occasions it expressly considered the
question may indicate the Court’s agreement that it would be
2 See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (“The text of the Alien Tort Statute provides
no express exception for corporations”); Beanal v. Freeport–McMoran, Inc., 197
F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir.1999) (implicitly allowing ATS jurisdiction over a
corporation but ultimately dismissing the claim for failure to plead sufficient
facts); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir.
2014) (holding that an ATS claim against a corporate defendant sufficiently
“‘touch[ed] and concern[ed]’ the territory of the United States” base partially, but
not entirely, on the defendant’s “status as a United States corporation”); Flomo v.
Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017–1021 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe I v.
Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1020–1022 (9th Cir. 2014); Doe VIII v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 527
Fed.Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
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inappropriate to draw a bright-line rule against domestic corporate
liability under the ATS. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114 (granting
certiorari on the question of corporate liability under the ATS, but
deciding the case based on the presumption against
extraterritoriality); see also Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1394 (granting
certiorari on the question of whether the ATS “categorically
forecloses corporate liability,” but holding more Al Shimari v.
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014)
(holding that an ATS claim against a corporate defendant
sufficiently “‘touch[ed] and concern[ed]’ the territory of the United
States” base partially, but not entirely, on the defendant’s “status
as a United States corporation”) narrowly that the ATS bars
foreign corporate liability). Moreover, the one federal court to
expressly consider the reach of Jesner held that domestic corporate
liability “fully aligns with the original goals of the ATS: to provide
a federal forum for tort suits by aliens against Americans for
international law violations,” and did not risk “offend[ing] any
foreign government.” Al Shimari, 320 F. Supp. 3d 781, 787 (E.D.
Va. 2018). Finally, “Congress’ failure to disturb [this] consistent
judicial interpretation,” of allowing corporate liability under the
ATS “may provide some indication that Congress at least
acquiesces in, and apparently affirms, that [interpretation].”
Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 338 (1988)
(citation omitted). In sum, the judiciary’s consistent interpretation,
the purpose of the ATS to avoid foreign policy concerns, and the
statute’s silence on allowable defendants all counsel against
categorically barring domestic corporate defendants under the
ATS.
II. The Trail Smelter Principal is a Recognized Principle
of Customary International Law Enforceable Under the
Alien Tort Statute
As a general manner, the Trail Smelter Principle is actionable
under the Alien Tort Statute as a “Law of Nations” because it is:
(1) a norm widely accepted by civilized nations; and (2) defined
with a specificity comparable to the three specific offenses
recognized in 1789, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Sosa.
542 U.S. at 725. While there were only “three principle offenses
against the law of nations” when the ATS was passed, the Court
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has made clear that other causes of action can be brought so long
as they are “specific, universal, and obligatory,” Id. at 726, 732
(citation omitted), and the court uses “judgment about the practical
consequences of making [new] cause[s] available to litigants in the
federal courts.” Id. at 732–33.
The Trail Smelter Principle is derived from the Trail Smelter
Arbitration, an international conflict between Washington State
and Canada. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1965 (1941).
A smelter in Canada emitted harmful air pollutants, which
traveled fourteen miles south to Washington and harmed
agriculture. Id. The panel announced that “no state has the right
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties
or persons therein.” Id. As detailed below, this Principle is
actionable as a law of nations under the ATS because it is widely
accepted by civilized nations in a variety of domestic and
international forums, and it proscribes a specific and definite
harm.
A. The Trail Smelter Principle is widely accepted by
civilized nations as an obligatory norm of
international law
When deciding whether a customary norm exists under the
ATS, courts “gauge[] [claims] against the current state of
international law, looking to those sources [they] have long, albeit
cautiously, recognized.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733. Customary
international law is law which is “the general and consistent
practice of states that is followed out of a sense of legal obligation.”
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 102, 103 (1987). See also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (stating courts
should look at “the customs and usages of civilized nations.”
(quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). Courts
have found principles to be customary international law when
embraced in international courts and tribunals, scholarly writings,
and international agreements, among other sources. See Filártiga
v. Peña- Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Statute of
the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 (listing such sources as “competent
proof”); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, §103 (stating these sources should be given
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“substantial weight”). The Trail Smelter Principle is found in all of
these sources, therefore satisfying Sosa’s first requirement.
The principle announced in Trail Smelter has been repeated
and agreed upon in several international contexts. Most notably, it
was adopted by the Declaration of the 1972 Stockholm Conference
on the Human Environment, under Principle 21, which was
endorsed by 113 nations, including the United States. U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972). The Trail Smelter Principle
was also adopted by the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development in Principle 2, which was endorsed by 178 nations,
including the United States. U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.I) (Aug. 12, 1992). This
principle was also repeated in the 2002 World Summit on
Sustainable Development3, the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long
Range Transnational Air Pollution4, the 1992 U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change5, and the U.N. Convention on
Biological Diversity6. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also
found the Trail Smelter Principle constitutes a “general obligation
of states.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226, 242, para. 29 (July 8).
Further, the Principle has been reflected in scholarly works too
numerous to quantify.7 This court should find the Trail Smelter
3 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Report of the World
Summit on Sustainable Development, 29, U.N. Doc A/CONF.199/20/Rev.1 (Aug.
26– Sept. 4, 2002).
4 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979,
T.I.A.S. 10541, 18 I.L.M. 1442.
5 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.
6 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
7 See, e.g. Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, International Environmental
Law 107 (1991) (describing the Trail Smelter decision to have “laid out the
foundations of international environmental law”); Rudiger Wolfrum, Purposes
and Principles of International Environmental Law, 33 Ger. Y.B. Int’l L. 308, 309
(1990) (“There is agreement in international law that, in general, transfrontier
damage is prohibited. This prohibition has essentially been developed under
customary international law.”); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the Existing
Customary Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in International Law
and Pollution 63 (Daniel B. Magraw Ed., 1991) (stating the obligation to prevent
transboundary pollution is “well established”).
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Principle meets Sosa’s first requirement because it has been widely
embraced by the United Nations, the International Court of
Justice, and various scholarly works.
B. The conduct proscribed by the Trail Smelter
Principle is defined with sufficient specificity
When the ATS was adopted, the three recognized offenses
were piracy, violations of safe conduct, and offenses against
ambassadors. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. However, the Supreme Court
made clear that other Law of Nations claims may be asserted, so
long as they are “defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms,” id. at 725, so as not to
open the floodgates to litigation for claims of a different nature. Id.
at 732–33 (the “determination of whether a norm is sufficiently
definite” must include consideration of practical consequences).
International norms found to be defined with sufficient
specificity include: state- sanctioned torture, Filártiga, 630 F.2d
876; forced labor, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D.
Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir.
2002); aerial pesticide fumigation, Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F. Supp.
2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007); aiding and abetting liability, Khulumani v.
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007);
nonconsensual medical experimentation, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,
562
F.3d
163
(2d
Cir.
2009);
and
extrajudicial
killings. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2010).
On the other hand, offenses found not to be specific enough to be
enforced under the ATS include: the use of herbicides in wartime,
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7,
43 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); and fraud. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001
(1975) (abrogated on other grounds).
The Trail Smelter Principle prohibits a specific offense—
transboundary pollution that directly harms people or property in
another State. It closely resembles a common law nuisance claim,
which courts routinely adjudicate. While a norm must be “specific”
and “definable” in accordance with Sosa, its precise contours need
not be universally agreed upon. For example, in Sosa, the Court
cited United States v. Smith to demonstrate what level of
specificity piracy is defined within the international context. Sosa,
542 U.S. at 732 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820)).
In Smith, the Court acknowledged that while piracy is defined in
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a variety of ways, there are certain core aspects of the principle
that are universally understood. Smith, 18 U.S. at 160–62.
Similarly, while the precise contours of the Trail Smelter Principle
may differ based on a court’s interpretation, the core aspects of the
principle remain clear, and specifically proscribe certain harmful
and direct transboundary pollution.
Although two courts found principles related to Trail Smelter
to be defined with insufficient specificity, these courts failed to
scrutinize whether the core aspects of the principles were defined
with the required specificity under Sosa. See Amlon Metals v. FMC
Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Beanal, 197 F.3d at
166–67. By misapplying the standard, these courts failed to
recognize that the Trail Smelter Principle does proscribe the
specific conduct of direct transboundary pollution which causes
concrete harms. Therefore, this court should hold the Trail Smelter
Principle is actionable under the ATS as a customary international
law. However, as explained in section VI, infra, Plaintiffs’ use of
the principle for the indirect harms of global climate change stretch
the doctrine too far.
III. Trail Smelter Imposes Obligations on Non-State Actors
This court should recognize that the Trail Smelter Principle
imposes obligations on non-state actors who emit harmful
pollutants that cause concrete damage in another country. When
recognizing an international customary law norm under the ATS,
a court must consider “whether [the norm] extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20. As an initial matter,
customary international law does not sweepingly foreclose
imposing liability on non-state actors. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding genocide violates
international law, regardless of whether undertaken by state or
non- state actor).
While the Trail Smelter Principle frames liability on
sovereigns, the original arbitration required the private smelter to
change its internal smelter operations, a very costly endeavor. This
court should not foreclose this type of redress in the future.
Furthermore, even if this court were to find that the Principle does

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5

18

2019]

RUNNER UP - BEST BRIEF

135

not generally impose obligation on non-state actors, it should hold
that obligations may be imposed upon private actors operating
under the color of law.
A. The Trail Smelter Arbitration imposed obligations
on the privately-owned smelter
Although liability in the Trail Smelter Arbitration was framed
in terms of the “state,” the arbitration imposed obligations on the
private Canadian smelter by requiring it to make operational
changes that would reduce its total emissions. See Trail Smelter
Arbitration at 1977 (“Nothing shall relieve the Smelter from the
duty of reducing the maximum Sulphur emission below the
amount permissible.”). These required operational changes cost
the smelter nearly $20 million. Catherine Prunella, An
International Environmental Law Case Study: The Trail Smelter
Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION ISSUES (2014). Therefore,
the Trail Smelter Principle leaves open the door to imposing
obligations on private actors.
Although few other courts have considered the question of
private liability under ATS claims using transboundary
environmental law principles and customary international law, at
least one court did consider the issue and found there were no
obvious policy reasons against imposing liability on private parties
for violations of such international law norms. In re Agent Orange.
373 F. Supp. 2d at 58; but see Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc.,
969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (finding that a private corporation
could not be bound by Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,
and instead “could be bound to such principles by treaty [only]” or
when acting under the color of law.). Even if this court is unwilling
to recognize that the Trail Smelter Principle applies directly to
private actors in all situations, the court should at least find such
liability is allowed in some situations, including where private
entities act under the color of law.
B. Trail Smelter Principle imposes obligations on
private parties acting under authority of a state
It is a long-standing precedent that private actors may be held
liable for international customary laws when they act under color
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of law. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 376 (“[A] corporation found to
be a state actor can be held responsible for human rights abuses
which violate international customary law.”). Both Beanal and
Arias considered claims under transboundary pollution principles,
and implied that the Trail Smelter Principle imposes liability on
private actors who operate under the color of law. Id. at 377
(applying the color of law test to private defendant); Arias, 517 F.
Supp. 2d at 227–28 (same). This court should hold consistent with
those cases, and In re Agent Orange, and find the Trail Smelter
Principle imposes obligations, at least in some instances, on
private parties.
IV. The CAA Displaces Mana’s Trail Smelter Claim Because
the Supreme Court has Already Held the Act ‘Speaks
Directly’ to the Issue of GHG Emissions
The District Court correctly ruled that the CAA displaces
Mana’s action under the ATS for alleged violation of the Trail
Smelter Principle. R. at 9. ATS claims are considered “claims under
federal common law.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. “Federal common law
is subject to the paramount authority of Congress.” Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. (Kivalina), 696 F.3d 849, 856 (9th
Cir. 2012) (citing New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
Therefore, Congress may displace a federal common law claim
when it adopts a statute that implicitly or explicitly “speaks
directly to the question at issue.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 424 (citation
and quotations omitted). The court here should follow Supreme
Court precedent, see Id., and find Mana’s claims are displaced by
the CAA because: (A) greenhouse gas emissions are the thrust of
the “particular issue” raised, Oneida Cty., N.Y. v. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985) (citation
omitted); (B) the “scope of the legislation and. . .scheme established
by Congress” comprehensively address greenhouse gas emissions,
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 859 (Pro, J., concurring) (citing City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois (“Milwaukee II”), 451 U.S. 304, 315 n. 8
(1981); and (C) the “reach of remedial provisions” in the CAA leave
no room for common law remedies. AEP, 564 U.S. at 425 (citing
Oneida Cty., 470 U.S. at 237–239).
A. The “particular issue” raised by Mana is GHG-
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induced climate change, which the Supreme Court
held is displaced by the CAA
“[T]he applicability of displacement is an issue-specific
inquiry.” Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856. Courts must examine the scope
of the “question at issue” in the claim. AEP, 564 U.S. at 424. The
thrust of Mana’s claim is that GHG emissions from the global sales
and combustion of HexonGlobal’s fossil fuel products cause climate
change and sea level rise, which harm Mana’s home and health,
and the entire island of A’Na Atu. R. at 4–5. Mana claims this
violates the Trail Smelter Principle, “which holds that
emissions. . .within the territory of one nation must not be allowed
to cause substantial harms in the territory of other nations.” R. at
8.
Mana’s claim is virtually indistinguishable from the common
law nuisance claim in Kivalina, which sought damages based on
the “conten[tion] that GHGs released by the Energy Producers [oil,
energy, and utility companies] cross state lines and thereby
contribute to the global warming that threatens the continued
existence of its village.” Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855. Mana’s claim
also bears remarkable similarities to claims in AEP seeking
abatement of GHG emissions from the defendants’ fossil-fuel fired
power plants, which allegedly contributed to global warming that,
in turn, risked harm to infrastructure, health, and public lands.
AEP, 564 U.S. at 418–19. In each case, the Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court held, respectively, that such common law nuisance
claims based on GHG emissions and climate change were displaced
by the CAA. See Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 854; see also AEP, 564 U.S.
at 424.
1. Emissions, not sales or production, are the
heart of Mana’s claim
To the extent Mana seeks to distinguish this case from AEP
and Kivalina by fashioning the claim as one based on
HexonGlobal’s production or sales of fossil fuels, R. at 9, rather
than emissions, such a maneuver has already been attempted and
failed in at least two district courts. See City of Oakland v. BP
P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting
Oakland’s assertion that AEP and Kivalina did not apply to a
nuisance claim that alleged harm from the sale of fossil fuels,
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reasoning the “harm alleged by our plaintiffs remains a harm
caused by fossil fuel emissions, not the mere extraction or even sale
of fossil fuels”); see also City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp.
3d 466, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). “If an oil producer cannot be sued
under the federal common law for their own emissions, a fortiori
they cannot be sued for someone else’s.” Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d
at 1024. Therefore, because Mana alleges injuries from climate
change caused by the emissions of fossil fuel combustion, not from
fossil fuels on their own, AEP applies and this court should hold
the CAA displaces Mana’s claim.
2. International emissions are beyond the reach of
U.S. courts
To the extent Mana aims to distinguish this case from AEP
and Kivalina by framing the claim as based on HexonGlobal’s
“global” actions occurring outside of the United States, R. 5, such a
tactic has already been attempted and failed in at least two district
courts based on the presumption against extraterritoriality, which
“constrains courts considering common law claims brought under
the Alien Tort Statute” and bars claims that “reach[] conduct
within the territory of another sovereign.” City of Oakland, 325 F.
Supp. 3d at 1025 (quoting Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117; see also City of
New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475. Alternatively, to the extent that
Mana’s claim focuses on domestic emissions resulting in
international harm, such issues are addressed and displaced by the
CAA, as explained below.
B. The scope of the CAA comprehensively addresses
GHG emissions from a spectrum of sources,
displacing Mana’s common law claims
A federal common law claim is displaced if Congress provides
“a sufficient legislative solution to the particular [issue] to warrant
a conclusion that [the] legislation has occupied the field to the
exclusion of federal common law.’” Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856
(quoting Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777
(7th Cir. 2011)). But, “[l]egislative displacement of federal common
law does not require the ‘same sort of evidence of a clear and
manifest [congressional] purpose’ demanded for preemption of
state law.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 423 (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at
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317). Further, “Congressional action, not executive action, is the
touchstone of displacement analysis.” Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858
(citing AEP, 564 U.S. at 424).
1. The CAA Directly and Comprehensively
Addresses Emissions from Stationary and
Mobile Sources, Regardless of the Status of
Regulations
The CAA directs the EPA to regulate “air pollutants” from a
comprehensive range of sources, including but not limited to: motor
vehicles, 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(1) (2012); new, modified, and existing
stationary sources (including power plants), Id. at §7411(b), (d), (f);
and commercial aircrafts. Id. at §7571(q). The Supreme Court held
that GHGs fit “well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition
of ‘air pollutant,’” and therefore “the EPA has statutory authority
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.”
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532. The Court subsequently and
unanimously held in AEP that the EPA also has the authority to
regulate GHGs from new, modified, and existing stationary
sources under CAA Section 111, and such authority displaces
federal common law nuisance claims related to GHG emissions
from power plants. 564 U.S. at 424–26. The EPA subsequently
regulated GHG emissions from a variety of mobile and stationary
sources. R. at 6–7. Although the Court in UARG limited (but did
not bar) EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs under some provisions
of the CAA, its narrow holding left Massachusetts and AEP as good
law, and the EPA maintains authority delegated by Congress to
regulate GHG emissions from a spectrum of mobile and stationary
sources. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2440–41, 2449; CONG. RES. SERV.,
R44807, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION AND LITIGATION:
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES, 22 (2017). Therefore, cases relying on
AEP in holding that the CAA displaces federal common law claims
for harms caused by GHGs also remain good law. See Kivalina, 696
F.3d at 855 (citing AEP, 564 U.S. at 424); City of Oakland, 325 F.
Supp. 3d at 1024; City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72.
2. “Congressional action” of the CAA displaces
Mana’s claims, regardless of the status of
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EPA’s regulations
While the CAA’s implementing regulations may be truncated
by the regulatory rollbacks of the Trump administration, see R. at
7, this is not relevant to a court’s determination of displacement.
“The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions. . .the
delegation is what displaces federal common law.” AEP, 564 U.S.
at 426. The Court in AEP held that plaintiffs’ nuisance claims
related to GHG emissions were displaced by the CAA regardless of
whether the “EPA actually exercises its regulatory authority.” Id.
at 425–26. Therefore, in our case, unless Congress rescinds its
delegation of authority to EPA to regulate GHGs as air pollutants,
Mana’s claims are displaced by the CAA under AEP, regardless of
the status of EPA’s regulations.
C. The CAA’s remedial provisions allow Mana to
enforce or seek to change GHG standards set
pursuant to the CAA, leaving no room for common
law
A third factor courts consider in determining if federal
common law is displaced is the statute’s “reach of remedial
provisions” or enforcement mechanisms. AEP, 564 U.S. at 425.
However, “the type of remedy asserted is not relevant to the
applicability of the doctrine of displacement. . .if a cause of action
is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.” Kivalina,
696 F.3d at 857 (emphasis added) (holding that a federal common
law nuisance claim for damages was displaced, when the Supreme
Court had already held such claims for injunctive relief were
displaced); accord Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1981). Common
law claims are displaced when the “statutory scheme established
by Congress provides a forum for the pursuit of [plaintiff’s] claims
before expert agencies” or in courts. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 326.
In our case, Mana’s claims are displaced because the CAA
affords “multiple avenues for enforcement” and “provides a means
to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide. . .the same relief the
plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law.” AEP, 564 U.S. at
425. In addition to government-led administrative, civil, and
criminal enforcement provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§7411(c), 7411(d),
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7413, 7414, the CAA includes a “Citizen Suit” provision that
permits any person to bring a private, civil enforcement action
against a corporation, government entity, or individual in federal
court if states or the EPA fail to enforce emissions standards
against regulated sources. AEP, 564 U.S. at 425 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a)). Further, states and private parties may petition for a
rulemaking “if the EPA does not set emissions limits for a
particular pollutant or source of pollution.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 425
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)). In addition, Mana may engage the
government of A’Na Atu to utilize the CAA’s “International Air
Pollution” provision, which requires the EPA and states take
remedial action when “air pollutant[s]. . . emitted within the
United States. . .endanger public health or welfare in a foreign
country.” 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a). This provision requires states to
“prevent or eliminate the endangerment” and invite affected
foreign nations to participate in any associated public hearing. Id.
at §7415(b). The combination of the CAA’s Citizen Suit, petition for
rulemaking, and International Air Pollution provisions afford
Mana the opportunity to impose GHG emission limits.
In sum, the CAA displaces Mana’s Trail Smelter claim because
Mana seeks to redress harm caused by GHG emissions, and the
Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and multiple district courts have
concluded the Act displaces such claims based on the its
comprehensive scheme addressing emissions and its array of
mechanisms to enforce or change emissions standards.
V. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Valid Claim Under the Public
Trust Doctrine and Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution
This court should uphold the District Court’s dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ claim under the public trust doctrine and the Due
Process clause of the United States Constitution. These doctrines
do not provide relief to Plaintiffs because: (A) the public trust
doctrine does not provide protections to the global climate system;
and (B) there is no fundamental right to a healthy and stable
climate.
A. The public trust doctrine does not provide a federal
cause of action nor provide relief for Plaintiffs’
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alleged climate-induced injuries
The District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim under the
public trust doctrine should be upheld because the scope of the
public trust doctrine does not provide federal protections, nor
protections to the global climate system. The common law public
trust doctrine does not provide protections for resources outside of
navigable rivers and tidal waters. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. State of
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). Moreover, the public trust
doctrine does not allow suits against the federal government
because “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.”
PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012). Therefore,
any relief sought by Plaintiffs under the public trust doctrine
would require this court to take two unprecedented steps by
creating a federal public trust doctrine and expanding the doctrine
beyond the scope allowed by any state or federal court.
1. The public trust doctrine applies to waterways,
not the climate system
The public trust doctrine is a long-standing doctrine with roots
firmly in ancient common law. See PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 603.
However, the American version of doctrine, ever since it was
announced in Illinois Central, has been used exclusively to protect
waterways and their surrounding banks and shores from
monopolization by private parties and has never been extended to
provide protections to the atmosphere or global climate system.
146 U.S. 387; see, e.g. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13
(D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561
F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curium) (“[Plaintiffs] have cited no
cases, and the Court is aware of none, that have expanded the
doctrine to protect the atmosphere.”); Aronow v. State, 2012 WL
4476642 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (same). Under the American
common law public trust doctrine, states are trustees to the public
to ensure submerged lands under navigable and tidal waters are
not disposed of in a way that would cause “substantial impairment
of the interest of the public in the waters” in navigation, fishing, or
commerce. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435. Here, in asking the
court to provide global atmospheric protections, Plaintiffs are
asking the court to extend the doctrine far beyond what any court
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has ever recognized. Therefore, this court should uphold the
District Court’s dismissal of the claim.
2. The public doctrine does not provide a federal
cause of action
Plaintiffs’ public trust claim is also legally deficient because it
fails to bring a valid federal cause of action, since the public trust
doctrine is purely a matter of state law. PPL Montana, 565 U.S.
576, 603–04. This court should follow the lead of the D.C. Circuit,
which dismissed a public trust claim, almost identical to Plaintiffs’,
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the doctrine is not a
matter of federal law. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz, 561 Fed. App’x at 8
(citing PPL Montana, 566 U.S. at 603–04); see also W. Indian Co.
v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007, 1019 (3d Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs’ federal question claim would require this court to impose
public trust duties on the federal government, an action no court
has ever recognized in a final judgement. See Alec L., 863 F. Supp.
2d at 13. Although, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224
(D. Or. 2016), allowed a similar claim to survive a motion to
dismiss, the District Court in our case properly chose to not follow
that unprecedented, singular, initial ruling of the District Court
for the District of Oregon. R. at 11. As the overwhelming weight of
legal precedent counsels against imposing such new obligations on
the federal government, this court should uphold the District
Court’s dismissal as a matter of law.
B. There is no constitutional right to protection of a
healthy or stable climate
Even if Plaintiffs could use the public trust doctrine as a cause
of action to bring their substantive Due Process claim, there is not
a constitutional right as claimed by Plaintiffs. First, Plaintiffs are
asking this court to go where no court has gone before by
announcing a fundamental right to stable and healthy climate
system under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Second, the Due Process Clause
does not impose an affirmative duty on the government to protect
against private harm, even when their actions substantially
increase risk of harm. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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1. History and tradition do not provide a right to a
stable climate
While cases like Plaintiffs’ claim have been heard by courts
across the nation, no federal court has ever found that Americans
have a constitutional right to be protected from general
environmental harm. In fact, federal courts have consistently
rebuffed similar attempts to provide constitutional protections for
the climate or a “pollution-free environment.” Nat’l Sea Clammers
Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1237–38 (3d. Cir. 1980),
dismissed and vacated in part on other grounds 453 U.S. 1 (1981).8
In order for Plaintiffs’ claim to succeed, this court would have
to go against all other courts and announce a new fundamental
right to government protection of a healthy and stable climate. The
steady refusal of courts to entertain substantive Due Process
claims for climate or environmental protections speaks to the
judiciary’s cautious approach in announcing new fundamental Due
Process rights. The Supreme Court insists any proposed
fundamental Due Process right must be “rooted in history and
tradition,” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989), and
the Court uses the “utmost care when [they] are asked to break
new ground in [the] field.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). Similar to
8 See also Concerned Citizens of Neb. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 970
F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1992) (no right to be free from environmental harm from
radioactive waste); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1970) (no
constitutional right to be protected from unnecessary and unreasonable
environmental degradation and destruction); S.F. Chapter of A. Philip Randolph
Inst. v. EPA, No. C 07-04936 CRB, 2008 WL 859985, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28,
2008) (“Plaintiffs also allege deprivation of the right to be free of climate change
pollution, but that right is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment either.”);
Pinkney v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1974)
(“[T]he Court has not found a guarantee of the fundamental right to a healthful
environment implicitly or explicitly in the Constitution.”); Gasper v. La. Stadium
& Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 720–21 (E.D. La. 1976) (“[T]he courts have
never seriously considered the right to a clean environment to be constitutionally
protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”), aff’d, 577 F.2d 897 (5th
Cir. 1978); MacNamara v. Cnty. Council of Sussex Cnty., 738 F. Supp. 134, 14243 (D. Del. 1990), aff'd 922 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1990); Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff’d, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.
1980); Upper W. Fork Watershed Assoc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, U. S. Army, 414 F.
Supp. 908, 931–32 (N.D. W.Va. 1976) aff’d, 556 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1977); Hagedorn
v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064–65 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); Tanner
v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1972).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/5

28

2019]

RUNNER UP - BEST BRIEF

145

their predecessors in District and Circuit courts around the
country, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a “deeply rooted in
our legal tradition” in a healthy and stable climate. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 722. To the contrary, the record shows the climate has
not been historically stable, the United States has a history of
supporting industries that produce GHG emissions, and Congress
only recently provided limited statutory protections for the
environment. R. at 4, 6, 10.
2. There is no constitutional right for protection
against private harm
In the District Court proceedings, Plaintiffs asserted a
fundamental right to a healthy and stable climate by relying on an
unprecedented denial of a motion to dismiss by the Oregon District
Court. R. at 11, citing Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1251–52. The
Supreme Court in DeShaney held the Due Process Clause does not
impose an affirmative duty on the government to protect against
private harm, even when their actions substantially increase risk
of harm. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189. The Juliana District Court
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss by relying on a Ninth
Circuit “government-caused danger” exception to the Supreme
Court’s DeShaney rule. This exception does not apply to the case
at bar because the United States government does not have the
required “special relationship” with Plaintiffs (as it would with
persons in its physical custody). DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
Further, the government here did not literally and directly create
the danger. Id. (holding state’s placement of a child in an abusive
home, resulting in coma and permanent brain damage, was not a
“deprivation” of Due Process).
Moreover, Plaintiffs here have not pled sufficient facts to show
the United States’ conduct “place[d] a person in peril in deliberate
indifference to their safety.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1251
(citing Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709 (9th
Cir. 1997)). In Juliana, the Oregon District Court admitted that
this rigorous standard “pose[d] a significant challenge for
plaintiffs,” but allowed the claim to move forward, finding the
plaintiffs alleged that defendants had acted with the requisite
state of mind, an allegation the court was required to accept as
true. Id. at 1252. The record in this case, on the other hand,
contains no allegation that the U.S. government acted with
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deliberate indifference towards Plaintiffs’ safety. The record states
that U.S. government has only been aware of the dangers of
climate change since the 1990s, long after the vast majority of GHG
emissions authorized by the government took place. R. at 6, 11.
Since learning of the dangers of climate change, the government
has taken steps to reduce GHGs in an effort to slow climate change.
R. at 6–7. Here, the court would have to go beyond the Ninth
Circuit’s government-caused danger rule requiring “deliberate
indifference,” and allow claims of negligence or strict liability to
impose a duty to act on the government.
Plaintiffs here are not only asking this court to follow Juliana,
they are asking this court to go further by extending the dangercreation exception to DeShaney far beyond where even the Oregon
District Court took the doctrine, for a Due Process right that does
not yet exist. Particularly in the face of consistent precedent
declining to extend Due Process rights to environmental
protection, see supra note 2, a single, unprecedented case surviving
a motion dismiss at the district court level is insufficient to
constitute a right “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed,” as required to establish a new fundamental right.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 720–721 (internal quotations omitted).
Therefore, this court should uphold the District Court’s dismissal
for failure to state a valid claim.
VI. Plaintiffs’ Public Trust Doctrine and ATS Claims are
Barred as Nonjusticiable Political Questions
Even if Plaintiffs presented valid ATS and public trust
doctrine claims, this court should dismiss them as nonjusticiable
political questions. While the judiciary is well-equipped to deal
with ATS, public trust, and Due Process claims generally,
Plaintiffs claims stretch these causes of action to the point where
they improperly tread on the executive and legislative branches of
the federal government. These claims are nonjusticiable because
they are “not legal in nature,” and concern complex issues of
“national polic[y]” that courts reserve for those political branches
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of the government. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean
Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). A case presents a nonjusticiable
political question if any of the six Baker v. Carr tests are met:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found [i] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
[ii] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [iii] the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or [iv] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or [v] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [vi] the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.

369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). When applying the Baker tests, courts
must engage in a “discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and
posture of the particular case.” Id.
A. Application of the first three Baker tests bar
Plaintiffs’ claims
The Supreme Court noted that the Baker tests “are probably
listed in descending order of both importance and certainty.” Vieth
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004). In the context of ATS
litigation, the Court has noted the separation-of-powers issues
addressed under the first three Baker tests are of particular and
serious concern. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28. Here, a “discriminating
inquiry” using the first three Baker tests show both of Plaintiffs’
claims are nonjusticiable, as they would require the court to create
a cause of action available to everyone in the world and would
require the judiciary to make complex scientific and policy
judgements the Constitution reserves for the political branches of
the government. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
1. Plaintiffs’ claims involve foreign policy decision
designated to the executive and legislative

31

148

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 10

branches
Under the first Baker test, claims are nonjusticiable political
questions where “constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department” is evident. Id. The U.S.
Constitution vests Congress with the authority “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Matters of
foreign policy and national security “are rarely proper subjects for
judicial intervention.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981).
Here, both claims brought by Plaintiffs tread on the powers of
the executive and legislative branches because they entangle
critical decisions of foreign climate change policy, not matters that
merely touch foreign relations. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
Plaintiffs are essentially asking this court to curb otherwise lawful
activities that rely on fossil fuels worldwide, instead of allowing
the political branches to continue to craft legislative solutions that
balance environmental, energy, and economic needs. Solutions to
the complex and global problem of climate change “cannot be
prescribed in a vacuum.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 427. This sensitive
balance “is appropriately vested in branches of the government
which are periodically subject to electoral accountability.” Gilligan
v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). This court should avoid wading
into international climate change and energy policy debates the
executive and legislative branches have already been addressing
though international treaties and legislation for decades. R. at 6–
8. For example, the United States has entered into United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris
Agreement and Congress has given the EPA the authority to
regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. R. at 7; see
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531. The fact that the current
administration has voiced its intention to withdraw from some past
steps addressing climate change does not give the judiciary
authority to step in to fill the executive or legislative branches’
policy making position.
2. Plaintiffs’ claims lack judicially discoverable
and manageable standards and require the
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court to make an initial policy determination.
Plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable under the second and third
Baker tests because they would require the court to make a policy
determination about appropriate quantities and methods to reduce
GHG emissions. See AEP, 654 U.S. 428. Under the second and
third Baker tests, a case is nonjusticiable for a “lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards,” or if it requires the court
to make an “initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.” Baker 369 U.S. at 217. A claim lacks
judicially discoverable and manageable standards if it presents
“complex[,] subtle” issues in which “courts have less competence”
than the political branches of the government. See Gilligan, 413
U.S. at 10. In regulating climate change and GHGs, the Supreme
Court recognized that courts “have neither the expertise nor the
authority to evaluate” the fundamental economic, social, and
national security policy issues raised by the regulation of
greenhouse gases, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533, and “lack the
scientific, economic, and technological resources [of] an agency. . .”
to regulate climate change. AEP, 564 U.S. at 428. Plaintiffs fail to
point to an accepted standard or methodology the court could
employ to address these complicated inquiries.
The implications of Plaintiffs’ common law-based claims are
sweeping; they would allow any party in the world who could allege
injury from climate change to a make a claim against any party
who is responsible in some way for producing GHG emissions. See
AEP, 564 U.S. at 428–29. Courts across the country would be
required to determine whether and to what extent each GHG
producer created climate changed-induced damages using the
general principals of tort and public trust law. Adjudicating these
disputes would also require the court to make an “initial policy
determination” about the appropriate level of GHGs each party can
produce without creating unreasonable harm to the climate or
significantly impairing the alleged atmospheric trust. See
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 855. Adding in the fact that GHG emissions
do not adhere to geographically discoverable borders makes the
impact of these emissions on an individual plaintiff even more
difficult to manage.
Even if this court had the authority to enact such a remedy,
reducing the emissions of the United States would not prevent
Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries because no “judicially discoverable
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standard” can simply stop climate global climate change and sea
level rise. Adjudicating this claim would require individual federal
judges to make intricate international policy decisions on climate
change and enact an appropriate standard for every GHG emitter
in the nation. Since courts are not in a possession to make such
initial policy determinations or manage a standard for granting
Plaintiffs’ relief, this court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims as
nonjusticiable.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs are ultimately asking this court to legislate common
law solutions to the global problem of climate change, when such
solutions have already been or should be decided by the political
branches. Therefore, this court should affirm the District Court’s
holding that the CAA displaces Plaintiffs’ claim brought under the
ATS for HexonGlobal’s alleged violations of the Trail Smelter
Principle. This court should also affirm District Court’s denial to
extend an unprecedented Due Process-based public trust claim to
government protection of a stable climate system. Further, to the
extent such claims are not otherwise barred, this court should find
they are barred by the political questions doctrine, as they present
sensitive international policy decisions. Finally, this court should
not craft its decision on grounds broader than necessary to resolve
the case. Although this court should dispose of Plaintiffs’ claims for
the aforementioned reasons, this court should not draw its holding
so broadly as to bar all ATS claims against corporate defendants
or all claims under Trail Smelter Principle for other kinds of
emissions harms, as such categorical bars would undermine
Congressional intent and international law.
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